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MICROLEVEL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES AS
DETERMINANTS OF NON-CEO EXECUTIVE PAY
MASON A. CARPENTER
JAMES B. WADE
University of Wisconsin—Madison
We dflvalop a thatny wheraiii the pay of luiii-CEO execiittves con be explained by
mlcio-leTel opportmiity atmctuns-^tbe intenectian of fiuutioiial position, CEO back-
groimd, hnnian capital, and firm Btrategic reaource allocatiini dedsions. Our tbeoiy
suggests a positive association between pay and a position made visible by rasoiuce
allocation dedsions, a ftanctkmal background similar to tbat of tbe CEO, and a position
tbat belps tbe firm manage strategic resource allocations. A unique longitudinal data
set tbat combines survey and aicbival data an tbe four bigbest ecbelons of senior
executives in large U.S. firms provided support for tbis multilevel firamework.
Executive compensation is an integral compo-
nent of corporate governance. Indeed, "few such
topics on strategic leadership generate the same
degree of controversy" (Finkelstein & Hamhrick,
1996: 263). The tremendous attention paid to com-
pensation can be attributed to beliefe that pay af-
fects executives' perceptions of equity and £Edmess,
motivates their behavior and, as a result, should
positively influence firm performance and other
significcuit outcomes when managed and set appro-
priately (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).
Consequently, understanding the detenninants of
executive pay is of great theoretical and practical
importance.
Most executive compensation research in strat-
egy and organization theory has focused on the pay
of CEOs; relatively little attention has been paid to
the compensation of other top executives (Barkema
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman,
1997; Murphy, 1999; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000). While important progress has been
made to suggest that non-CEO executive pay may
reflect such fectors as industry, firm size, diversifi-
cation strategy, firm-specific compensation sys-
tems, and/or a manager's rank or human capital
(Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Fisher & Govindaia-
jan, 1992; Galbraith & Menill, 1991; Leonard, 1990;
Main, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1993; O'Reilly, Main, &
Crystal, 1988; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996), several im-
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portant questions remain unanswered (Barkema &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). For instance, how do the re-
source allocation decisions that result from a firm's
strategy differentially impact the pay of its non-
CEO executives? Similarly, what influence do
CEOs have on the pay of other executives, and who
benefits from this influence? And finally, is the
e%ct of human capital on executive pay uniform
within a given firm, or does it depend on other
critical factors? Therefore, the primary objective of
this research was to provide a multilevel theoreti-
cal firamework that begins to answer these ques-
tions and to test it on a unique sample of senior
executives in large U.S. firms.
THEORY DEVEIX)PMENT
As noted above, our interest in studying the pay
of senior executives below the level of the CEO is
motivated in part by the observation that previous
compensation research in strategy and organization
theory has focused almost exclusively on chief ex-
ecutive officers (for comprehensive reviews, see
Finkelstein and Hambrick [1996], Gomez-Mejia
and Wiseman [1997], Murphy [1999], and Tosi et
al. [2000]). Although a few studies have examined
lower-level executive pay in the context of tourna-
ments (Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Main et
al., 1993; O'Reilly et al., 1988) or firameworks link-
ing firm strategy and human capital to the pay of
the managers of strategic business units (Balkin &
Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992;
Galbraith & Merrill, 1991), research on the determi-
nants of non-CEO executive compensation has all
but abated. Indeed, since top executives are typi-
cally tasked with implementing strategy, and com-
pensation schemes are an integral component of
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this implementation, there remains the practical
need to better explain likely determinants of pay.
Most prior theorizing and research on executive
compensation has emphasized pay differences
across firms, not within firms. For instance, Mil-
kovich, Gerhart, and Hannon (1991) showed that
non-CEO executives in R&D-intensive industries
were paid differently than those in other industries.
Gomez-Mejia (1992) similarly reported that diver-
sification strategy affected executive compensa-
tion. However, given the sociopolitical nature of
pay determination (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; El-
hagrasey, Harrison, & Buchholz, 1999; Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Porac, Wade, & Pollock,
1999; Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1995),
there is good reason to suspect that executives' pay
varies within firms, in addition to across firms.
And, perhaps with the exceptions of Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia (1990) and Roth and O'Donnell
(1996), little research has examined the conditions
giving rise to within-firm differences in executive
pay heyond such factors as hierarchical level and
title (Leonard, 1990; Main et al.. 1993; O'Reilly et
al., 1988).
In the following sections, we propose a theoreti-
cal framework that describes how executive com-
pensation may be a function of processes operating
at multiple levels in organizations. We ref^r to the
outcome of such processes as microlevel opportu-
nity structures, a theoretical construct that we de-
fine as falling somewhere between the macro con-
cept of managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Boyd,
1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) and Zald's
(1969) fine-grained notion of strategic decision
points. As we demonstrate below, opportunity
structures are essentially the result of a confiuence
of factors and events, and they provide particular
executives the prospect of greater pay. Our multi-
level framework necessarily integrates several
theories, but, as a reflection of the sociopolitical
nature of pay determination, draws primarily on
the upper echelons perspective (a meta theory),
and the power and resource dependence perspec-
tives. The upper echelons view provides insights
into the potential roles and consequences of ex-
ecutive characteristics like functional back-
ground, position, and human capital (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). Power and resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; Thompson.
1967) allow scholars to specify when such char-
acteristics are likely to solve critical organiza-
tional problems and thus generate pay opportu-
nities for particular executives.
Specifically, we aigue that the salary accompa-
nying an executive's functional position is influ-
enced by a number of organizational factors, in-
cluding the actions and resource allocation
decisions arising from her or his firm's strategy
(like product and international diversification, and
investments in advertising, research and develop-
ment, and plant and equipment), and the func-
tional background of the firm's CEO. Such factors
are expected to create micro-level opportunity
structures that, in tum, increase incumbents' cash
compensation relative to that of other executives in
their firms. It is further proposed that those strate-
gic contingency relationships may be strongest
when executives have greater human capital in the
form of work experience and education. Although
cash compensation is often highly correlated with
total pay (and has been reported to generate sub-
stantively identical results (Lambert et al.. 1993;
Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Main, O'Reilly, &
Wade. 1995), we focus on cash compensation be-
cause it typically creates less uncertainty for exec-
utives than contingent pay schemes (Harris & Hel-
fat, 1997; Sanders, 2001) and is, thus, preferred by
them (Jensen & Miirphy, 1990). Given the bargain-
ing power that our theory implies for executives,
we expect greater cash pay to be the most likely
outcome, since it reflects executives' preferences
and attitudes toward risk (Gomez-Mejia & Wise-
man, 1997; Sanders, 2001). Therefore, cash compen-
sation is the form of pay most conceptually relevant
to our theorizing, and it is empirically well-suited to
our tests of the compensation consequences arising
from microlevel opportunity structures.
Firm Strategy, Functions, and ExecutiTe
Cash Compensation
The development of our multilevel theory starts
first at the macro level of firm strategy, and then
progresses to the more micro antecedents of oppor-
tunity structures (CEO and executive characteris-
tics). Following the theorizing of Mintzberg (1978)
and empirical work of Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1990), Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997), and Car-
penter (2000), we characterize strategy as the pat-
tern resulting from a stream of resource allocation
decisions. Such a pattern is comprised, for in-
stance, of a firm's resource allocation choices in
research and development, marketing, diversifica-
tion, capital investments, and international mar-
kets. This view follows the strategic choice per-
spective of Child (1972) wherein firms are under
considerable constraints imposed by their environ-
ments but also have some latitude in their actions.
Those actions, in tum, may generate fundamentally
different ways of allocating resources (Bower,
1970), as revealed by differences in patterns across
firms. In the context of this study, and controlling
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for Other factors, we argue that such fundamental
differences between firms are likely to create
microlevel opportunity structures that, in tum,
lead to compensation differences among executives
within firms.
O\ir argument is supported conceptually by re-
search on resource dependence and early research
on power (a construct integral to the resource de-
pendence perspective). For instance, Thompson
observed that jobs represent both "a unit in the
organization and a unit in the career of an individ-
ual. Joining of the two [is] a result of a bargained
agreement . . . determined through power pro-
cesses" (1967: gg-116). Developing that logic,
Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings
(1971) proposed that power flows to positions
whose incumbents cope with critical contingencies
facing their firms. Later, Hambrick (1981) suggested
that such contingencies were largely a function of a
firm's strategy and showed that individual execu-
tives had high power when their positions' do-
mains included dominant requirements imposed
by strategy. Extending Hambrick (1981), and con-
sistent with oiur overarching argument, the work of
Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) showed that the de-
gree to which academic administrators were com-
pensated depended on how critical their functions
were to their imiversity, vis & vis environmental
conditions. Specifically, they reported that athletic
directors were more highly paid in public univer-
sities than in private ones and reasoned that those
pay difiierentials occinred because public universi-
ties were more dependent on athletic directors for
raising funds than were private universities.
Whereas the above research identified strategic
contingencies on the basis of characteristics of a
firm's external environment, we focus instead on
those demands created by the actual actions and
resource allocation decisions imderlying a firm's
strategy. Nonetheless, the conceptual argument
developed above should apply equally well to
external and internal firm-created contingencies
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Weick, 1979). For
most firms, cash and executive attention are finite
resources (Thompson, 1967), so when considered
in relation to other strategic actions, expenditures
on R&D, marketing, and capital investment should
provide a reasonable indication of a firm's relative
reliance or dependence on one functional area
rather than others. For instance, Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1990: 491), followed by Geletkanycz
and Hambrick (1997) and by Carpenter (2000), used
such expenditures to identify "important but spe-
cific aspects of a firm's strategic profile." And just
as a firm's level of product diversification or inter-
national diversification has been shown to afEBct
overall CEO and top management team (TMT)
member pay (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Sanders & Car-
penter, 1998), these expenditures may be similarly
likely to create different functional dependencies
or management problems within the firm (Michel &
Hambrick, 1992; Song, 1982).
Moreover, if certain executives are better posi-
tioned than others to manage or mitigate the prob-
lems arising bam such strategic resource alloca-
tions—by virtue of the responsibility, experience,
exposure, and network centrality accruing to them
as a consequence of their functional responsibili-
ties—they are likely to be provided with a micro-
level opportunity structure that allows them to per-
sonally gain in the form of higher compensation. At
the very least, and analogous to the positive effect
of firm size on CEO pay (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996; Tosi et al., 2000), non-CEO executives may
similarly benefit when their respective functional
areas are relatively laige. That view was echoed by
Coff (1999), who theorized that an executive is best
poised to bargain for a portion of a firm's profits
when his or her role is clearly associated with
strategic interests of the firm. Again, in our frame-
work, those strategic interests are represented by a
firm's significant resoiu^e allocation decisions and
other strategic actions. Taken in combination, the
arguments presented above suggest the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Executives in functional posi-
tions associated with larger strategic resource
allocations will receive greater cash compen-
sation than will other executives in their firm.
CEO Background, Executive Proximity, and
Cash Compensstioii
The first level of our theoretical framework con-
cerns the microlevel opportunity structures arising
from firm strategy—specifically, the actions and
resource allocation decisions that fiow from strat-
egy; the second level of our framework is an effort
to show how opportimity structures arising from
CEO functional similarity may also impact the pay
of executives in particular functional areas. Man-
agement researchers often point to top executives,
particularly CEOs, as establishing or reinforcing
firms' sociopolitical climates. In this upper eche-
lons perspective, theories in organizational behav-
ior, sociocognitive psychology, and social compar-
ison are integrated to portray firms as refiections of
their top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Lending support to that characterization. Song
(1982) showed that a CEO's background and prior
experience had implications for firm strategy and
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the selection of other executives. As noted in up-
per echelons theorizing (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996), this latter effect on the choice of executives
would be consistent with the notion of attraction-
selection-retention (Schneider, 1987), wherein
other executives are hired and rewarded in part
owing to their similarity to the CEO. Consequently,
salient management characteristics like the func-
tional background of a finn's chief executive may
actually become imprinted on an organization.
Over time, executive background effects are fur-
ther reinforced and amplified, as CEOs develop
distinct routines (Keck & Tushman, 1993), strong
preferences for strategy formulation and implemen-
tation (Gabarro, 1987), "instincts" about protecting
their bases of power (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1988), and interest in their professional legacies
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Successor chief execu-
tives are often picked, recruited, or promoted on
the basis of their perceived fit with extant func-
tional priorities in a firm, so that a reinforcing
spiral is likely to occur (Michel & Hambrick, 1992;
Miles & Snow, 1978). To the extent that a CEO has
been chosen on the basis of functional experience,
or to the extent that this experience has conse-
quently shaped the strategy of the firm, then the
upper echelons perspective might also be invoked
to predict that CEOs will favor, in terms of com-
pensation, departments that represent their partic-
ular work experience. At the very least, functional
similarity is a determinant of group homogeneity
and has been shown to result in intentional and
unintentional favoritism (Schneider, 1987). There-
fore, in our theoretical firamework, the second
microlevel opportunity structure is a consequence
of an executive's and a CEO's functional back-
ground similarity. We suggest the following hy-
pothesis linking chief executive background to ex-
ecutive pay:
Hypothesis 2a. All else being equal, executives
in functional positions that are similar to the
functional backgFound of a firm's CEO will
receive greater cash compensation than will
other executives in the firm.
The prior hypothesis predicts that executives'
microlevel opportunities for higher pay increase
with functional similarity to their CEO. To the ex-
tent that such pay is partially a function of socio-
political processes (which both we and extant re-
search assert to be the case), theory also suggests
that higher^ranked executives may benefit more
from such similarity than lower-ranked ones, even
among top executives. For instance, prior research
has demonstrated that individuals are more likely
to develop respect for others in their work groups
than for those in other work groups. Explanations
for this observation range from simple propinquity
{for instance, hierarchical proximity to the CEO) to
the development of shared worldviews as a result
uf working toward common goals (Baldwin, Bedell,
& Johnson, 1997; Krackhardt & Stem, 1988). We
expected the same phenomenon to occur in top
management teams because, for the most part, par-
ticular executives are afforded greater opportunity
to interact with their CEO by virtue of their rank.
Similarly, although Hambrick (1995) noted that top
management team members' interests and objec-
tives are typically skewed in favor of their
business-imit and fiinctional domains, higher-level
executives are most likely to have an organization-
wide orientation that overlaps that of the CEO, and
they are consequently likely to be perceived as
having common interests and objectives. As a re-
sult of such regular interaction and common inter-
ests, chief executives may more easily rationalize
paying some executives more than others.
On the one hand, it could be argued that any
compensation benefits arising from CEO propin-
quity are likely to extend equally to all executives
as they rise in rank. For instance, chief executives
have great discretion over the pay of other execu-
tives (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997), and they may reconmiend or sup-
port higher relative pay for the colleagues they
work with most closely. In that view, rank would
predict pay differences, but functional similarity
would not. On the other hand, we suggest that pay
benefits may be particularly generous for certain
executives because hierarchical proximity ampli-
fies the positive effects of functional similarity hy-
pothesized in Hypothesis 2a. Such amplification
may be further compounded by the complex socio-
political processes surrounding selection and hier-
archy that resulted in the retention of functionally
similar executives in the given firm's upper eche-
lon (Fligstein, 1987; Ocasio & Kim, 1999; Useem &
Karabel, 1986). In summary, we predict that:
Hypothesis 2b. All else equal, the positive ef-
fect of functional similarity on cash compen-
sation will be highest for executives occupying
levels closest to the level of the CEO.
Stratagy, Human Capital, and Executive
Cash Compensation
In the third and final level of our theoretical
framework, supplementing functional position
(Hypothesis 1) and CEO effects (Hypotheses 2a and
2b), we propose that executives' pay will also be a
function of their individual human capital. Exam-
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pies of relevant human capital include managerial
experience, education, functional expertise, and
tenure (Becker, 1962; Hogan & McPheters, 1980).
While human capital is an integral aspect of upper
echelons research (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996),
only a few studies have tested human capital the-
ories in the context of executive pay; most of those
have looked primarily at CEO pay (e.g., Harris &
Helfat, 1997).
Among the small numher of studies that have
reported significant himian capital effects, Agar-
wal's (1981) work showed job-related experience to
be significantly associated with executive compen-
sation. Fisher and Govindaiajan (1992) similarly
reported a weak, but positive, relationship between
the pay of business-unit managers and years of
education. Most recently, Harris and Helfat (1997)
showed that work experience gained outside an
industry allowed external successor CEOs to gainer
greater starting cash compensation than within-
industry successors. And, while there have been
several studies investigating the association be-
tween CEO tenure and pay from a human capital
perspective, no consistent patterns have been
found (Deckop, 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996; Leonard, 1990; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990).
This overall lack of empirical support for a human
capital proposition has compelled some organiza-
tions researchers to conclude that such capital "is
unlikely to account for much variance in executive
pay" (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 274).
We argue that researchers may have been unable
to detect stronger linkages between human capital
and managerial pay because of inattention to the
microlevel opportunity structures in which partic-
ular jobs are embedded. More specifically, our the-
ory suggests that human capital may have its stron-
gest impact on pay when individuals are already in
positions that have the potential to be the locus of
managing strategic resources. The superior oppor-
tunity structure in such positions allows the indi-
viduals occupying them both to exploit the politi-
cal and social capital accruing to them through
their formal positions (Burt, 1997; Leonard, 1990)
and to leverage such sociopolitical capital with
their existing human capital (work experience and
education) to extract higher salaries.
From both an upper echelons and a resource
dependence perspective, the microlevel opportu-
nity structures surrounding critical positions will
make it more likely that the individuals occupying
them will be better positioned to exploit their hu-
man capital. This is an important distinction, since
prior work has emphasized the direct (but weak)
effect of human capital on pay (Leonard, 1990),
suggesting that, typically, such effects will be in-
variant. In contrast, according to our theory, indi-
viduals in noncritical areas are imlikely to have
much leverage in extracting higher salaries, regard-
less of the amoimt of human capital they possess.
The following hypothesis summarizes our oppor-
tunity structure logic:
Hypothesis 3. Executives in functional posi-
tions associated with strategic resource alloca-
tions will receive greater cash compensation
for their human capital (their education and
work experience) than will other, comparable,
executives in their firm.
METHODS
Sample
The data used in the study were taken from a
five-year survey of executives conducted annually
by a major compensation consulting company from
1981 to 1985. The human resoinxie department of
each participating firm was asked to provide data
on approximately 120 individuals at different hier-
archical levels in the organization. In order to max-
imize the time series information available for this
study, we included only those firms that partici-
pated in the survey for all five years in the sample.
Participating fiims provided data for individuals in
their top 12 levels; however, we included only the
top 4 levels to be consistent with definitions of top
management teams used in prior executive com-
pensation research (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).
Since the CEO is assigned as the only member of
level 1, this level was dropped from the sample.
Level 2 includes the most senior executives, a num-
ber of whom may sit on a firm's board of directors.
Their job titles include chief operating officer, chief
financial officer, president, and division president.
Level 3 includes the next tier of executives, such as
senior and executive vice presidents. Level 4 in-
cludes higher-level vice presidents.
The resulting database included over 17,135 ex-
ecutive-year observations from 90 laige, publicly
held Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 firms over the
five-year period. Executive-level data included
base compensation, annual bonus, and salary (base
plus bonus), years of education, firm tenure, job
tenure, functional responsibilities, and interna-
tional responsibilities. Following Ocasio and Kim
(1999), we took data on CEO functional backgroimd
from the Forbes annual CEO pay survey. Missing
CEO background data were compiled firom Dun's
Reference Book of Corporate Managements. Firm-
level financial and other quantitative data were
obtained from annual reports and Wharton Re-
search Data Services. Executive cash compensation
1090
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was lagged one year by gauging it at time t + 1 (that is.
as salary paid at f + l plus bonus paid at f + 1 based
on performance at time 0> while all other variables
were gauged in the preceding year at time t.
Variables
Dependent The survey provided data on execu-
tives' salaries and bonuses. As in prior research
(Harris & Helfat, 1997; Lambert et al., 1993; Sanders
& Carpenter, 1998), cash compensation for the ex-
ecutives in the sample was computed as the sum of
base salary and annual bonus. The sum was then
"logged" so that extreme values would not bias the
results. Although cash compensation provides the
best test of our theoretical model, as a practical
matter no information on the amount of contingent
pay (such as stock options) was available at the
time of the survey, nor was it required for public
disclosure (and even today it is only disclosed for
the top five highest-paid executives).
Independent Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b predict
that executives' functional positions will interact
with strategic resource allocations or CEO back-
ground to affect their pay. Researchers often make
attributions about the nature of an executive's work
experience and social position on the basis of their
functional departments in their organizations
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason.
1984), but we viewed each executive's current re-
sponsibilities solely as indicative of a functional
position's criticality or potential power, not of
power possessed by the individual apart from his
or her department. For each individual in the sur-
vey, the company provided information on the
functional department, broken out by the category
that the employee worked in (such as finance, mar-
keting, and so forth). Positions in such areas as
general administration, operations, and law collec-
tively constituted the omitted category. (However,
we did use separate dummy control variables for
each; see "Control," below.) Using this information,
we coded dunmiy variables denoting an employ-
ee's functional position as follows:
The category finance position included but was
not limited to finance executives, controllers,
treasurers, payroll managers, cash managers, and
budget managers; the survey identified over 25
executive positions as in finance. Marketing po-
sition included marketing, sales, and advertising.
Typical positions placed into this category were
marketing executives, sales executives, product
managers, and advertising executives. Finally,
we grouped all engineering and research and de-
velopment executives into the category research
and development position. Engineering execu-
litwmui
tives were included in research and development
because these individuals are critical in taking
the ideas or prototypes developed by those in
R&D and transforming them into viable products.
Finally, identifying the International responsibil-
ity function is potentially problematic because
many individuals throughout a firm may have
international responsibilities. For instance, there
may be individuals in finance and marketing de-
partments who spend a large amount of their time
dealing with international issues. Consequently,
we coded individuals into the category interna-
tional responsibility position if they reported
having a/iy international responsibilities, part- or
full-time. This position classification superseded
the other possible functional classification for a
given executive. Overall, these four functional
categories are consistent with those generally
used in upper echelons research, where each
TMT member is designated as being from a par-
ticular functional background (Bantel & Jackson.
1989; Keck. 1997: Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
In order to measure the traditional forms of hu-
man capital, for Hypothesis 3 and the control vari-
ables, we gauged executives' levels of education
and work experience. Education was simply mea-
sured as years of formal education. Thus, those
with high school educations would have 12 years
of education, and those that stopped after complet-
ing their undergraduate degrees would be coded as
having 16 years of education. We computed work
experience using the following formula: work ex-
perience equals age minus education minus 6. We
assumed that individuals started their formal edu-
cations at age six and began working immediately
after completing their educations. As we noted ear-
lier, there is some evidence that work experience
and education are related to salary levels. Although
organizations research has portrayed firm tenure as
a measure of human capital (that is, firm-specific
work experience [Leonard. 1990]). we found no
substantive differences between the effects of firm
tenure and our variable. Consequently, results are
presented using the measure of work experience
described above. As discussed below, following the
logic that human capital earns increasing returns
up tu a point, after which the marginal returns to
it begin to fall (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996;
Mincer, 1970), the effects of both education and
work experience were modeled with squared terms
to account for their likely curvilinear (inverted U-
shaped) effects on pay.
Strategic contittgency variables. Hypothesis 1
predicts that the actions and resource allocation
choices underlying a firm's strategy will moderate
the relationship between executives' positions and
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their cash compensation; Hypothesis 3, in turn,
suggests such strategic actions and choices will
determine the value of executives' human capital.
To test both those sets of interactions, we examined
four categories of strategic resouroe allocations: (1)
financial (the logged value of capital expenditures
and absolute level of diversification calculated as
the number of four-digit SIC codes reported by a
firm), (2) marketing (the logged value of advertising
expenses), (3) research & development (the logged
value of R6-D expenses), and (4) international (the
logged value of foreign sales). Admittedly, these
categories are not exhaustive, but organizations re-
search suggests that they tap into critical aspects of
firms' value chains and strategies, and they are
often cited as among the most critical strategic de-
terminants of firm success and sin:vival (Gomez-
Mejia, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990, 1996;
Guthrie & Datta, 1998; Henderson & Fredrickson,
1986; Porter, 1985; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998;
Song, 1982).
In general, the larger the value of a strategic re-
source allocation variable, the greater a firm's de-
pendence on the functional area corresponding to
that allocation variable (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990; Hambrick, 1981). Contingency relationships
were identified intuitively, with specific executive
functions linked to those contingencies that ap-
peared most relevant to them. For example, accord-
ing to our framework, the finance function should
be critical to capital-intensive or highly diversified
firms (Melone, 1995; Song, 1982). Similarly, the
marketing function should be most valuable in
firms that devote large amoimts of resources to
marketing and advertising (Bowman & Daniels,
1995; Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987); executives in
R&D are expected to be most valuable to finns that
spend a laige amount of resources in developing
new and innovative products (Chaganti & Samb-
harya, 1987). Finally, positions with international
responsibilities may be particularly important in
films that have significant overseas sales (Carpen-
ter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Sambhaiya, 1996).
For our tests of Hypothesis 1, we created specific
interaction variables by multiplying an executive's
functional background by the relevant strategic re-
source allocations following the pairing procedure
described above. For Hypothesis 3, multiplicative
interactions were created between education and
work experience and the respective contingency by
function interaction; this latter procedure is de-
scribed more fully in the results section.
Similarity to CEO functional back^ound. To
test the effects on executive pay of CEO functional
background/executive functional position similar-
ity (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), we created a dummy
variable in which 1 equals "CEO same," and 0
equals "CEO diffierent." The Forbes annual com-
pensation survey categorizes GEO functional back-
ground into categories ranging from "administra-
tive" to "technical." The survey identifies a single
background for each GEO. Initial analysis of our
sample indicated that potential areas of similarity
existed in ten Forbes categories, which we clus-
tered as follows: (1) administration, (2) finance and
investments, (3) legal, (4) operations, (5) research
and development, and (6) retail, sales, and market-
ing. Although the determination of similarity to
GEO functional background based on the Forbes
survey and the numerical job code listings from our
survey data was relatively objective and straightfor-
ward, we took the additional precaution of using
two raters. No disagreements of substance emerged,
and the two reviewers reached full agreement on
the final coding scheme.
Control. We controlled fat firm size (total assets)
and prior performance (return on equity). Large
firms that are performing well (high-performing
firms) may pay their executives most. Because hu-
man capital has been cited as a potential determi-
nant of executive pay, we also controlled for work
experience and education level using "main effBct"
and squared terms, as described above (Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1996; Mincer, 1970). We similarly
controlled for the main effects of executives' func-
tional positions (finance, marketing, R&D, and in-
ternational) for the reason that external labor mar-
kets for those functions may have unobserved
effects on pay (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987). Since
the variable assessing a position's similarity to the
GEO's functional background was calculated using
other functional backgrounds in addition to those
above, as an added precaution we also controlled
for administrative, law, and operations and produc-
tion positions using dummy codes for each in tests
of Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Leonard (1990) suggested that human capital in-
fiuences executive pay indirectly, as opposed to
directly, by serving as an internal sorting criterion.
Thus, human capital provides an entrie to higher
ranks in an organization, which in turn results in
higher pay. To address this issue, we controlled for
executives' organizational rank using dummy
codes for levels 2 and 3 (excluding level 1, the
GEO); level 4 was the omitted category. We also
created four dummy variables to control for poten-
tial period (year) effects; the first year was the ex-
cluded year. Finally, in addition to the variables
mentioned above, all strategic contingency vari-
ables used to calculate the interactions were re-
tained as controls.
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Analyses
We tested the hypotheses by estimating fixed-
effects models using STATA statistical software.
Fixed-effects modeling controls for unobserved dif-
ferences between firms. The STATA fixed-effects
algorithm generates a dummy variable for each
firm, and this controls for constant, unmeasured
differences among firms that may explain differ-
ences in the dependent variable (Greene, 1990). For
instance, because economists have long observed
that some firms pay very well across all positions,
while the pay of other firms for comparable posi-
tions is very low (high-wage versus low-wage
firms), or have particular evaluation systems in
place that reinfbrce pay differentials, the inclusion
of firm controls is important because it accounts for
these otherwise unobserved effects. Industry dum-
mies are similarly not included in the fixed-effects
time series models because industry membership is
constant across each firm during the period stud-
ied. As noted above, across-year effects were ac-
counted for using year dummy variables.
Importantly, fixed-effects modeling does not con-
trol for potential problems arising from autocorre-
lation (that is, nonindependence), and this feature
could have indeed biased our results, since many
executives were observed more than once in the
sample (that is, they reappeared each year). Em-
ploying a fixed-effects model at the executive level
would prove unsatisfactory, since many executive
characteristics, such as functional backgroimd. are
unlikely to vary year to year; the potential for au-
tocorrelation owing to time invariance thus was
present, preventing the completion of any analyti-
cal algorithms. Recognizing these difficulties, we
conducted an extremely conservative test in which
we randomly sampled one executive from each
level, from each firm, for each year, and ran our
regression analyses on this reduced random sam-
ple. For the human capital analyses, we randomly
sampled one executive from each level, within
each function, for each firm, for each year. For all of
the hypotheses, we repeated this random sampling
procedure ten times and compared the results of
the runs.
The outcomes of such a procedure are similar to
those generated by using the Quadratic Assignment
Procediu'e (QAP; Hubert, 1987), which other re-
searchers have used to investigate nonindependent
relationships (Gulati, 1995; Haunschild & Miner,
1997; Krackhardt, 1987). The common underlying
motive is to determine whether results using the
full sample are or are not an artifact of nonindepen-
dent observations. Our results obtained using the
random procedure were substantively unchanged
(as to the sign, size, and significance ot each coef-
ficient, and the variance explained) from those us-
ing the full sample. Therefore, it appears that the
results validating our theoretical framework, re-
ported below, are not simply an artifact of autocor-
relation and the nonindependence of executive
observations.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and corre-
lations among the variables. In Table 2 we report
tests of Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b. Although all the
analyses account for period effects (year), we omit-
ted results for those four control variables from the
tables in order to conserve space. As expected, in
this sample higher-ranking executives were paid
more than those in lower ranks, and average pay
increased with calendar year.
Model 1 in Table 2 reports the effects of our
control variables. Consistent with prior research,
firm size and performance have positive effects on
compensation. This model also shows that the hu-
man capital measures (work experience and educa-
tion) are curvilinearly associated with pay for the
firms in our sample. Specifically, the positive main
effects and negative squared term effects suiggest an
inverted U-shaped relationship. The dummy vari-
ables for all the position functions are similarly
significant. With executive rank controlled, the co-
efficients suggest that marketing positions gamer
the most pay of the four categories, followed in
order by international, R&D, and finance positions.
Finally, with the exception of capital expenditures,
the strategy contingencies also impact average ex-
ecutive cash compensation for the sampled firms.
Since we already accounted for firm size and per-
formance in the regressions (along with our other
controls), the proxy effects reported for the finan-
cial, marketing, R&D, and international contingen-
cies are independent of those controls. Interest-
ingly, international sales. R&D intensity, and
advertising intensity all have positive effects on
salary levels, while diversification has a negative
impact.
Model 2 in Table 2 reports the tests of Hypothesis
1, stating that executives will be paid most when
they occupy critical functional positions, as deter-
mined by the actions and resource allocations un-
derlying firm strategy. To test this hypothesis, we
created multiplicative terms to capture the interac-
tion of the strategic contingency variables with
each executive's department. For instance, where
we predicted that executives in finance positions
are likely to be paid more, relative to other execu-
tives, in firms facing high levels of diversification
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TABLE 2
Results of Fixed-Effects Regrassioii Predicting Logarithm of Cash Compensation"
Variables
Total assets
Prior ROE
Education
Education squared
Work experience
Work experience squared
Level 2
Level 3
Finance position
Marketing position
Research and development position
International responsibility
Administrative position
Legal position
Operations position
Capital intensity
Diversification
Advertising intensity
R&D intensity
Foreign sales intensity
CEO background similarity
CEO proximity (similarity x level 2)
CEO proximity (similarity x level 3)
Finance position X capital intensity
Finance position x diversification
Marketing position x advertising intensity
Research position x RftD intensity
International x foreign sales intensity
Constant
Adjusted If
Change in If
Model
0.15**
0.02*
0.11**
-0.00**
0.04**
-0.00**
0.66**
0.22**
0.08**
0.17**
0.10**
0.11**
0.01*
-0.02**
0.01
0.02**
0.02**
6.93**
.60**
11
(.02)
(.01)
(.02)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.21)
Model12:
Hypothesis 1
11.15*'
n.()2*
0.11**
- 0.00**
0.04**
O.(X)**
0.66**
().a2**
0.04*
0.14**
0.03
(1.12**
0.01*
-0.02**
0.01
0.01*
0.02**
0.00
0.01**
0.01**
0.02**
-0 .00*
6.92**
.62**
.02'*
1.02)
1.01)
(.02)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
1.01)
1.02)
(.01)
(.02)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.30)
Model13:
Hypothesis 2a
0.15*'
0.01*
0.09**
-0.00**
0.04**
-0.00**
0.65**
0.22**
0.06*
0.08
O.ll**
0.14**
-0.03*
0.10*
0.01 *
-0 .02**
0.01
0.02*
0.02**
0.03**
7.05**
.61**
.01**
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
1.01)
(.30)
Model 4:
Hypothesis 2b
O . I . T "
0.02*
o.oa**
-0 .00**
0.04**
-0.00**
0.65**
0.22**
0.06*
0 15**
0.08
0.11**
0.14**
-0.03*
0.10*
0.01*
-0.02**
0.01
0.02*
0.02**
0.02**
0.04*
0.02
7.04**
.62**
.01**
1.01)
r.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
(.03)
(.02)
(.30)
Model
All
15:
Hypotheses
0.15*-
0.02*
0.10**
-0.00**
0.04**
-0.00**
0.64**
0.22**
0.03**
0.13**
0.02**
0.12**
0.14**
-0.03
-0.10**
0.01
-0.02**
0.01*
0.01**
0.02**
0.01*
0.05*
0.02
-0.00
0.01**
0.01*
0.02**
-0.00*
7.03**
.64**
.04**
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
(.03)
(.021
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.30)
" Standard errors are in parentheses, n = 17,135.
'' Logarithm.
* p < .05
* * p < . 0 1
Two-tailed tests, with the exception of interactions.
or capital intensity, we created a multiplicative
interaction with finance and each of these latter
contingency variables, obtaining two new interac-
tion variables. Our hypothesis would be supported
for each contingency prediction by a positive and
significant coefficient for the interaction variable
that specifies the main effects of the variables used
to create the contingency relationship.
Since the results were substantively unchanged
when each interaction was tested in separate
models, we report only the fully specified model
containing all interactions. The capital expendi-
tures interaction was significant and positive in
the individual models, but it was not significant
in the full model. Every other interaction is sig-
nificant, and all but one is in the predicted direc-
tion. Finance executives are paid more in highly
diversified firms; marketing and R&D managers
are similarly likely to benefit when they are in
advertising- and R&O-intensive firms, respec-
tively. These effects are quite substantial. For
example, R&D executives in R&D-intensive firms
(which we defined as being at the 75th percen-
tile) receive 12 percent pay premiums as com-
pared to their counterparts in firms that have
lower R&D expenditures (at the median level).
Similarly, the salaries of finance executives in
highly diversified firms are also 10 percent
higher than those in firms that sell in only a few
product-markets. In contrast, although interna-
tional responsibilities translate into greater pay
overall (that is, a positive main effect], the hy-
pothesized relationship is negative— t^hat is, the
interaction between international experience and
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foreign sales intensity has a negative effect on
cash pay. Therefore, except for the results for
international sales and capital expenditures. Hy-
pothesis 1 is supported.
In supplemental analyses (not reported), we
tested for the possibility that other interactions (be-
yond our theoretical model) between executive
functions and contingencies better explained exec-
utive pay. Such a test provides additional evidence
that (1) the function/contingency match-ups were
appropriate and (2) selected strategic actions and
resource allocation choices result in higher pay for
the functions we identified, as opposed to all func-
tions. For instance, in the model testing the inter-
action between R&D intensity and research posi-
tions, we added the three other possible functional
interactions with R&D intensity (finance position,
marketing position, and international responsi-
bility). We repeated these steps for each contin-
gency domain (financial, marketing, R&D, and in-
ternational). In all cases, our theorized interactions
explained more variance in pay than the additional
post hoc interactions. Moreover, in most cases the
supplemental interactions were not significant; in a
few cases, the post hoc interactions were negative
and significant (that is, finance executives received
less pay in marketing-intensive and R&D-intensive
firms). Taken together, these results validate our
choice of focal interactions and the general conten-
tion that firms make trade-ofk among resource al-
location choices and that such trade-offs differen-
tially affect executive pay within the firms.
Hjrpothesis 2a predicts that executives who are
in functions similar to the function that is the back-
groimd of the CEO will receive higher cash com-
pensation. Recall that the CEO background variable
was coded 1 to signify such similarity; otherwise it
was coded 0. We also controlled for the other po-
sition variables used to calculate CEO-executive
functional similarity but excluded from our strate-
gic contingency predictions. The positive, signifi-
cant coefficient for the CEO similarity variable in
model 3 provides support for Hypothesis 2a, The
magnitude of this effect is modest, however, in that
executives who are in functions similar to the back-
ground of the CEO receive, on average, a 3 percent
pay premium.
To test Hypothesis 2b, which predicts that prox-
imity will positively moderate the effects of CEO-
executive functional similarity on executive pay,
we created two multiplicative interactions by inter-
acting the similarity variable with each of the
dummy variables representing executive hierarchi-
cal rank. When these two additional interactions
were added in model 4, only the interaction coef-
ficient for the highest level (level 2) was significant.
Moreover, since the significant coefficient is posi-
tive, support is provided for Hypothesis 2b. The
main effect for CEO-executive functional similarity
is somewhat weaker, but it remains positive and
significant. From a practical standpoint, executives
received a pay premium of nearly 7 percent when
they were in functions similar to the CEO's back-
ground and proximate in level. Thus, as predicted,
the positive effect of CEO functional similarity is
clearly strongest for those executives closest in
rank to the chief executive officer of their firm.
Finally, the combined results for the CEO simi-
larity variables and all contingency interactions are
presented in model 5. Support for Hypotheses 1,
2a, and 2b is reaffirmed in this complete model.
However, the coefficient for CEO-executive func-
tional similarity is lower than that reported in
model 4 (though it still explains over 6 percent of
executive pay). Therefore, the relationship between
CEO similarity and executive pay appears to be
both direct and indirect (that is, partially mediated)
through executive proximity and the strategic con-
tingencies fiacing a firm and its top managers.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that executives' education
and work experience will have the strongest effect
on their salaries when they were in positions asso-
ciated with strategic resource allocations. In order
to test this hypothesis, we partitioned the data to
create four subsamples composed of (1) executives
in finance positions, (2) executives in marketing
positions, (3) executives in research and develop-
ment positions, and (4) executives with inter-
national responsibilities. For each group, we
reestimated our cash compensation models and in-
teracted the key strategic allocation for a given
group with our human capital measures. Because
the effects of our human capital variables are non-
linear (squared), it was further necessary to control
for the additional possible two-way interactions
created by a component of the squared term and the
respective strategic contingency.
Table 3 (a-d) shows the results for the tests of
Hypothesis 3. To conserve space, we only present
results for the human capital main effects and in-
teractions. The other control variables described
above were retained in the analyses, but results for
them are excluded from the tables. Support fbr
Hypothesis 3 required that the interactions be-
tween a strategic contingency variable and the lin-
ear and squared terms of the human capital variable
be both positive and significant. However, the ad-
ditional interactions complicated the interpretation
of the coefficients because they could produce non-
linear effects over the range of the human capital
variables. Consequently, if one of the significant
interactions were positive while the other was neg-
udftnn' ui .Vliinngfiiifiii hiiiiui.
TABLE 3
I)H,:.-M.|M.:
Summaiy of Results of Fixed-EfiEscts Regressions Predicting Logarithm of Cash Compensation for
Functional Subsamples*'**
Variables
(3a] Finance positions subsample
Education
Education squared
Work experience
Work experience squared
Education x capital intensity
Education squared x capital intensity
Education x diversification
Education squared x diversification
Work experience x capital intensity
Work experience squared x capital intensity
Work experience x diversification
Work experience squared x diversification
Adjusted R^
(3b] Marketing positions subsample
Education
Education squared
Work experience
Work experience squared
Education x advertising intensity
Education squared x advertising intensity
Work experience x advertising intensity
Work experience squared x advertising intensity
Adjusted FP
(3c] Research positions subsample
Education
Education squared
Work experience
Work experience squared
Education x R&D intensity
Education squared x R&D intensity
Work experience x R&D intensity
Work experience squared X R&D intensity
Adjusted fl^
(3d] International positions subsample
Education
Education squared
Work experience
Work experience squared
Education x foreign sales
Education squared x foreign sales
Work experience x foreign sales
Work experience squared X foreign sales
Adjusted fl^
.Model 1
.1)2.0 (.OS]
.U01 (.00]
.1)42** (.00]
.001** (.00]
.005** (.02]
.1)01** (.00]
.Olfi* (.02)
.000' 1.00]
..=57*
.076* (.04]
.001 (.00]
.033** (.00]
.000** (.00]
.021* (.01]
.001* (.00]
.31*
.080 (.08]
-.001 (.00]
.031** (.00]
-.000** (.00]
-.019 (.02]
.000 (.00]
.30
.086* (.03]
-.001 (.00]
.037** (.00]
.000** (.00]
.000* (.00]
-.001* (.00]
.33*
Model 2
.127** (.04)
-.002* (.00)
.043** (.01]
-.000** (.00]
.004* (.00]
-.001* (.00]
-.000 (.00]
.000 (.00]
.57*
.019 (.04]
.001 (.00]
.023** (.00]
-.000** (.00]
.004** (.00]
-.000** (.00]
.31*
.005 (.03]
.000 (.00]
.025** (.01]
-.000** (.00)
-.001 (.00]
.000 (.00]
.30
.089* (.03]
-.001* (.00]
.038** (.00]
-.000** (.00]
.000 (.00)
.000* (.00]
.33*
Model 3
.()4(i (.08)
.001 (.00)
.034** (.01)
-.000* (.00)
.002* (.02)
-.002* (.00)
.017' (.02)
- .000' (.00)
.003** (.001
-.000* (.00)
-.002* (.00)
.000* (.00)
.59*
.089* (.04)
-.001 (.00)
.022** (.00)
-.000* (.00)
.014* (.01)
-.001* (.00)
.004** (.00)
-.000** (.00)
.32*
.062 (.08)
-.000 (.00]
.024** (.01]
-.000** (.00]
-.014 (.02]
.000 (.00]
- .000 (.00)
.000 (.00)
.:n
.086* (.03)
-.001 (.00]
.038** (.00]
-.000** (.00)
.000* (.00)
-.001* (.00)
-.000 (.00]
.000 (.00]
.33'
" Summary tables are provided to preserve space: AU models reported above also include controls for year, executive rank, total assets
(log], prior ROE, capital intensity, diversification, advertising intensity, R&D intensity, foreign sales intensity, and CEO-executive
similarity. Results of control models are available from the authors upon request. Standard errors are in parentheses.
'' For the samples represented in 3a, 3b. 3c. and 3d. respectively, n's = 4.726, 3,124. 1,786. and 923.
*p < .10
* p < .05
* * p < .01
Tests were two-tailed, except for interactions.
ative, support for Hypothesis 3 could only be de-
termined by decomposing the interaction; this pro-
cess is explained below and in the Appendix.
Table 3 contains no cases in which the interac-
tions between a strategic contingency variable and
the linear and squared terms of the human capital
variable are all positive and significant. In contrast,
the human capital interactions with capital inten-
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sity, between education and diversification (3a),
and between advertising intensity and both educa-
tion and work experience (3b) were significant but
bad mixed signs; the education interactions and the
interaction of squared work experience and foreign
sales were also significant (3d). Although such re-
lationships suggested support for Hypothesis 3, it
was necessary to decompose and then graph the
effects of the human capital variables at high and
low levels of the strategic contingency variables in
order to determine if the hypothesis was ultimately
supported. Given that the contingency interactions
contain squared tenns, graphing the functional
form of the interactions was likely to reveal that the
relationships between human capital and strategic
contingencies were nonlinear.
To decompose the interactions, we first desig-
nated strategic contingency values as low or high
using median and 75th percentile values, respec-
tively. As an example, advertising intensity was
$25 million (in constant 1980 dollars) at the me-
dian and $340 million for those in the 75th percen-
tile among the firms in our sample. Such decom-
position based on high and low values revealed
that within finance, marketing, and international
positions, executives earned significantly higher
returns from their human capital when they were
in positions made critical to the firm as a result of
the actions and resource allocation choices under-
lying its strategy. The Appendix provides details
on these decomposition calculations; additional in-
formation is provided in Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan
(1990). For instance, comparisons between firms
with low and those with high advertising values
showed that marketing executives earned up to 14
percent more for their work experience than peer
marketing executives when they were in adver-
tising-intensive firms. Such strategic-contingency-
based pay differences were considerably higher
among finance executives (facing capital expendi-
tures and diversification contingencies), and con-
siderably lower among executives with interna-
tional responsibilities (peak pay difference of 6
percent). No human-capital-based differences were
detected among R&D executives.
To even better understand the functional form of
the contingent relationships suggested above, we
graphed the effects of the human capital contin-
gency interactions on cash compensation over the
entire range of human capital variables. Such
graphing revealed that, for those with finance or
international responsibility positions, their human
capital effects were a gradually increasing function
of their respective strategic contingency. Specifi-
cally, at low levels of education and work experi-
ence, the marginal effect of human capital on pay
among executives in the finance and international
subsamples was negligible; the strongest positive
relationships were detected at the high ends of
education (20 years) and work experience (35
years). For instance, executives with international
responsibilities gained no premium for their work
experience when it totaled less than 5 years, even
in highly global firms. In contrast, executives in
those same firms with 35 years of work experience
garnered 6 percent higher pay as a result of their
work experience than comparable others when
their firms had large foreign sales.
The effects of human capital were similarly strik-
ing for marketing executives; even after the main
effects of human capital were controlled for, those
executives realized greater returns to their educa-
tion and work experience along with increases in
the marketing contingency. For example, marketing
executives in marketing-intensive firms with two
years of work experience earned 4 percent more for
an equivalent amount of work experience than
their functional counterparts; that pay spread grew
to 10 percent with 12 years of work experience, up
to a maximum premium of 18 percent after 26
years, and gradually leveled off thereafter. There-
fore, the results of decomposition and graphing
suggest some support for Hypothesis 3 and, when
taken in combination with the tests of Hypotheses
1, 2a, and 2b, corroborate the prediction that posi-
tion, strategic resource allocations, and human cap-
ital create microlevel opportunity structures for ex-
ecutives, which they in tum translate into higher
relative pay.
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of this article was to in-
troduce microlevel opportunity structures and
present our initial tests of a multilevel theory of ex-
ecutive compensation. Using the complementary
lenses of upper echelons, resource dependence, and
power theories, we predicted that the confluence of
executive positions, strategic contingencies, CEO
characteristics, and himian capital would lead to mi-
crolevel opportunity structures, which in tum could
afford particular executives higher pay. We found a
consistent pattern of results to support that prediction
and provided robust empirical validation for our
overarching theoretical framework. Specifically, ex-
ecutives received greater cash compensation when
they occupied positions in which they were likely to
be associated with strategic resource allocation
choices made by their finn and when they had func-
tional responsibilities similar to the background of
the CEO. Civen the particular resource {^locations
arising as a result of firm strategy, we also demon-
lOOH
strated that executives were able to gamer greater
returns to their education and work experience in
some cases. Taken together, our theory of microlevel
opportunity structures and supportive results par-
tially answer recent calls for "a better understanding
of what determines executive pay" (Barkema &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 143). The implications of our
study for theory and future research are discussed
below.
Implications of Results
Overall, the pattern of results reported here con-
tributes to researchers' theoretical understanding of
the upper echelons, resource dependency, and
power perspectives by demonstrating how organi-
zational and individual characteristics intersect to
affect executive pay. According to an emerging up-
per echelons perspective, executives, primarily
CEOs, are compensated for the criticality of the
tasks that they must manage (Finkelstein & Ham-
brick, 1988; Henderson & Frediickson, 1996). Sim-
ilarly, it is reasonable to expect that such relation-
ships extend to the pay of other executives
throughout a firm. However, although that perspec-
tive has typically emphasized the external and ma-
crolevel determinants of pay (that is, environment,
firm size, and corporate strategy], this study
showed how the many faces of firm strategy (ac-
tions and resource allocation choices) may result in
different intemal resource dependencies, and thus
have different pay implications for particular exec-
utives. Furthermore, we showed that executives
themselves vary in the position and human capital
requisite to managing the contingencies arising
from differences in leadership (like CEO back-
ground) and strategic resource allocations. Conse-
quently, functional position, along with education
and work experience, created certain microlevel
opportunity structures that executives converted
into higher pay.
The majority of results for executive compensa-
tion confirmed our theorizing on the importance of
executives' positions, in conjimction with strategic
resource allocations and CXO similarity, as re-
fiected in Hypotheses l-2b; however, the negative
interaction of international responsibility with for-
eign sales (Table 2) was directionally opposite our
prediction. That counterintuitive result can be ex-
plained, perhaps, by a social capital perspective
(Burt. 1997). For instance, the literature on expatri-
ates suggests that foreign assignments are often a
risky career move for both executives and their
firms and that time spent gaining international ex-
perience has the concomitant cost of less political
clout back at headquarters. In some ways, expatri-
ates may tace microlevel liability structures, as op-
posed to opportunity structures. Certainly, it ha.s
been consistently shown that U.S. expatriates are
"out of sight, and out of mind" during international
assignments (Lancaster. 1995), a condition that
may negatively impact these executives' social cap-
ital at headquarters. A related explanation for the
observed interaction may be that none of our sam-
pled firms realized more than 30 percent of their
revenues overseas. Thus, international executives
already low levels of social capital may combine
negatively with a low level of expert power when
their firms have only small stakes in nondomestic
markets.
The human capital hypothesis (Hypothesis 3)
also received support. Even though it was impor-
tant that we demonstrate some human capital ef-
fects, in terms of microlevel opportunity structures,
a more critical hurdle was the need to show that
such capital could explain more than marginal
variance in executive pay. We believe that we suc-
ceeded in that endeavor. Indeed, executives earned
significantly greater returns to their education and
work experience in capital- and advertising-inten-
sive firms (over 18 percent), while those with in-
ternational responsibilities earned up to 6 percent
premiums for their work experience, in conjunc-
tion with increases in the levels of resources de-
ployed to their respective strategic contingencies.
Our results for non-CEO executives complement
those of Harris and Helfat (1997), who theorized
and found that replacement CEOs from outside the
industry of the firm they were entering could bar-
gain for greater cash pay since their presumed lack
of both firm- and industry-specific human capital
put them at greater risk. In contrast, consistent with
the notion of microlevel opportunity structures, we
showed how firm-specific himian capital (like
functional position) could serve to leverage general
human capital such as education and work experi-
ence when executives' functions were associated
with critical contingencies created by their firm.
FutuFe Research Directions
Our study has left some questions unanswered,
suggesting future research opportunities. Four of
these questions are particularly important. For in-
stance, the survey data constrained the study to a
period spanning the early to mid 1980s. Although
this may be a practical limitation of the data set, we
have been unable to answer the question as to
whether our results generalize to the present. At a
fundamental level, we expect our construct of
microlevel opportunity structures to generalize
well to other periods, sini^e it incorporates a basic
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tension: firms manage contingencies and resources
through people, and those people can bargain for
the price of their services. In view of the changing
face of corporate America, and perhaps given the
drivers of the opportunity structures that we iden-
tified, arguments could be made that our results
would be different in contemporary firms, or that
changing contingencies would result in different
distributions of pay across functions. The latter
argument is consistent with the literature on circu-
lation of control in large public corporations (Flig-
stein, 1987; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).
A related limitation of our data is that it provided
information only on cash compensation, and not on
other long-term forms of pay, such as stock options;
data on these forms of pay would have allowed us
to use total pay as a dependent variable. As a prac-
tical matter, stock options were not a common com-
ponent of non-CEO executive pay in the early
1980s. However, compensation studies conducted
with data from other periods—^prior to oxas (Lew-
ellen & Huntsman, 1970), contemporary with it
(Main et al., 1995), and after it (Lambert et al.,
1993)—have shown cash pay to be so highly cor-
related with total pay that the former is an adequate
proxy for the latter (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Research-
ers are still divided as to the reliability of estimat-
ing the value of long-term compensation (the com-
ponent of pay not included in our data), since such
estimates are based on a series of complex mathe-
matical assumptions that are seldom entirely met
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 303; Gomez-Mejia,
1994; Kerr & Kren, 1992). Regardless, valid research
questions remain as to whether and how the
relationships found in this study would be re-
flected in executive pay when long-term incentives
have been fully accoimted for, or during periods
when cash pay is not a reliable proxy for total
compensation.
The second and third questions concem causal-
ity and firm performance, respectively. Indeed,
although we used a lagged structure and control
variables that allowed us to suggest causal relation-
ships between executives' positions, himian capi-
tal, and pay, we have not established causality. An
alternative motivation may be that, when filling
critical positions, firms are more apt to hire "better-
qualified" individuals— t^hose whose track records
elsewhere allow them to bid up their salaries when
they are recruited to key posts. In those cases, ex-
ecutives will be paid more than others in the firms
for reasons beyond the human capital we identi-
fied. Such an interpretation does not really provide
an alternative theoretical explanation, but instead
suggests one possible mechanism by which critical
positions are filled.
Also implicit in our theoretical model is the no-
tion that executives benefit from their unique posi-
tions, in part, because they are able to translate
their microlevel opportunity structures into com-
petitive advantage for their firm. Indeed, our argu-
ment could be partially an economic one, wherein
executives gamer a portion of the profits they are
expected to generate for a firm by virtue of their
positions and backgrounds (Coff, 1999; Hitt, Bier-
man, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). Nonetheless, we
have been able to show that the importance of a
position or human capital can be determined, at
least in part, absent an assessment of the perfor-
mance consequences of such importance. However,
perspectives such as agency theory suggest that
compensation schemes can serve to align the inter-
ests of managers and shareholders (Jensen & Mur-
phy, 1990). Therefore, it is still valuable to under-
stand better whether some executives actually
apply their position and human capital to the bet-
terment of their firms' financial performance, and
whether the pay diffiBrentials we observed are a
consequence or a determinant of the alignment of
position, skills, and performance (Jensen & Mur-
phy, 1990).
A fourth avenue for research arises from the £act
that we did not actually measure executives' behav-
iors, abilities, or individual differences, but instead
inferred them from their backgrounds, positions,
years of education, and work experience. As a re-
sult, by following the norms of past upper echelons
and resource dependence research, we have "black-
boxed" important underlying processes and causal
mechanisms that may have been otherwise inter-
esting or significant to our arguments. Research is
missing that would establish a direct link between
such factors and the background characteristics
and outcomes that we measured. Our theory on
microlevel opportunity structures may imply that
executives take some action (that is, actively bar-
gain) to realize greater pay, but it is also possible
that they simply benefited from being in the right
place at the right time. Such a possibility does not
deny the existence of microlevel opportunity stmc-
tures, but instead raises questions about what in-
fluences these stmctures more— f^iactors beyond
non-CEO executives' control, or the executives
themselves. Therefore, studies are needed to illu-
minate the relationships among firm strategies, ex-
ecutive positions, and characteristics, and the ac-
tual cognitions and behaviors of executives.
Conclusioii
In conclusion, this study contributes to the or-
ganization and strategy literatures by integrating
1100 nl
them and advancing prior work on both. Specifi-
cally, by developing the notion of microlevel op-
portunity structures, our research inserts position
and human capital into the discussion of non-CEO
executive compensation and suggests that execu-
tives' functional positions and backgrounds play a
significant role in the degree to which they realize
pay advantages. We have demonstrated the impor-
tance of studying the compensation of executives
beyond the top five highest-paid individuals in a
firm, and we have explored the distinct yet com-
plementary roles of strategic contingencies, CEO
similarity, and human capital that detennine the
degree to which executive compensation varies
within firms. Indeed, by studying the notion that
executives' bargaining power is contingent upon
the actions and resource allocation choices under-
lying firms' strategies (which in turn generate
microlevel opportunity structures), we hope we
have suggested fruitful new avenues for organiza-
tions and strategy research. Although our work has
clearly shown that there are limits to the impacts of
position and human capital on executive pay, it
also suggests that such factors can continue to play
a valuable role in research on corporate governance
and top management teams in the context of com-
plex organizations.
REFERENCES
Agarwal, N. 1981. Determinants of executive compensa-
tion. Industrial Reladmia, 20: 36-46.
Baldwin, T., Bedell, M., & Johnson. ). 1997. The social
fabric of a team-based M.B.A. program: Network ef-
fects on student satisfaction and performance. Acad-
emy of Managemaa Joumal, 40: 1369-1397.
Balkin, D., & Gomez-Mejia, L. 1990. Matching compen-
sation and organization strategies. Sfnrtogic Afion-
agement Journal, 11: 153-169.
Bantel. K., & Jackson, S. 1989. Top management and
innovations in banking: Does the composition of the
top team make a difference. Strategic Managanent
fonmal, 10:107-124.
Barkema, H., & Gomsz-Mejia, L. 1998. Managerial com-
pensation and firm performance: A general research
framework. Academy of Management Journal, 41:
135-145.
Barkema, H.. & Peimings, J. 1998. Top management pay:
Impact of overt and covert power. Organixatimi
Studies, 19: 975-1003.
Becker, G. 1962. Investment in human capital: A theoret-
ical analysis. Journal of Political Ecmiomy, 70: 9:
9-49.
Bower, J. 1970. Managing the resource allocation pro-
cess. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Bowman, C, & Daniels, K. 1995. The influence of funcj-
tionai experience on perceptions of strategic priori-
ties. British Joumal of Management, 6:157-167.
Burt. R. 1997. The contingent value of social capital.
Admznistnib've Science Quarteriy, 42: 339-365.
Carpenter, M. A. 2000. The price of change: The mle of
l^O compensation in strategic variation and devia-
tion from industry strategy norms. Joumal of Man-
agement, 26: 1179-1198.
Carpenter. M. A.. Sanders, VV. G., & Gregersen. H. B.
2001. Bundling human capital with organizational
context: The impact of international assignment ex-
perience on multinational firm performance and
CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal, 44:
493-512.
Chaganti, R., & Sambharya, R. 1987. Strategic orientation
and characteristics of upper management. Strategic
Management Joumal, 8: 393-401.
Child, J. 1972. Organization structure, environment, and
performance: The role of strategic choice. Sociology,
6: 1-22.
Coff. R. 1999. When competitive advantage doesn't lead
to performance: The resource-based view and stake-
holder bargaining power. Organixatian Science, 10:
119-133.
Deckop. J. 1988. Determinants of chief executive com-
pensation. Industrial and Labm Relations Review,
41: 215-226.
Elhagrasey, G.. Harrison. J. R., & Buchholz, R. 1999.
Power and pay: The politics of CEO compensation.
Joumal of Management and Governance, 2: 309-
332.
Finkelstein, S.. & Boyd, B. 1998. How much does the CEO
matter? The role of managerial discretion in the set-
ting of CEO compensation. Academy of Manage-
ment Joumal, 41: 179-199.
Finkelstein. S.. & Hambrick. D. 1988. Chief executive
compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation. Stra-
tegic Management Joumal, 10: 543-558.
Finkelstein. S.. & Hambrick. D. 1990. Top management
team tenure and organizational outcomes: The mod-
erating role of organizational tenure. Admiidstrative
Science Quarterly, 35: 484-503.
Finkelstein. S.. & Hambrick, D. 1996. Strategic leader-
ship: Top executives and ffteir effects on mganixa-
tion. St. Paul: West.
Fisher, J., & Govindarajan. V. 1992. Profit center manager
compensation: An examination of market, political
and human capital factors. Strategic Management
Joumal, 13: 205-217.
Fligstein, N. 1987. The intraoiganizational power strug-
gle: Rise of finance personnel to top leadership in
large corporations. 1919-1979. American Sociolog-
ical Review, 52: 44-58.
2002 Carpenter and Wade 1101
Gabarro, J. 1987. Tbe dynawics of takbig charge. Bos-
ton: Harvard Business School Press.
Galbraith, C, & Nflemll, G. 1991. The effect of compen-
sation program and structuie on SBU compensation.
StmlB^c Management Journal, 12: 353-371.
Geletkanycz, M., & Hambrick, D. 1997. The external ties
of top executives: Implications for strategic choice
and performance. Afbninistnifjva Science Quar-
teily, 42: 654-681.
Gomez-Mejia, L. 1992. Structure and process of diversi-
fication, compensation strategy, and firm perfbi^
mance. Strateffc Management Jtmmal, 13: 381-
397.
Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. 1997. Reframing execu-
tive compensation: An assessment and outlook.
Jonmal of Management, 23: 291-374.
Greene, H. 1990. Ecmuanetric analysis. New York:
Macmillan.
Gulati, R. 1995. Social structure and alliance formation
patterns: A longitudinal analysis. Administrative
Science Quarterfy, 40: 619-652.
Guthrie, ]. P., & Datta, D. K. 1998. Corporate strategy,
executive selection, and firm performance. Human
Resource Management, 37: 2:101-115.
Hambrick, D. 1981. Environment, strategy, and power
within top management teams. Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterfy, 26: 253-276.
Hambrick, D. 1995. Fragmentation and other problems
CEOs have with their top management teams. Cali-
fomia Management Review, 37(3]: 110-127.
Hambrick, D., & Mason, P. 1984. Upper echelons: The
organization as a reflection of its top managers.
Academy of Management Review, 9:193-206.
Harris, D., & Helfat, C. 1997. Specificity of CEO human
capital and compensation. Strateffc Management
Journal, 18: 895-920.
Haunschild, P., & Miner, A. 1997. Modes of interoigani-
zational imitation: The effects of outcome salience
and uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly,
42: 47Z-500.
Hayward, M., & Hambrick, D. 1997. Explaining the pre-
miums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO
hubris. Administrative Science Quarterfy, 42:103-
127.
Henderson, A., & Fredrickson, ]. 1996. Infonnation-
processing demands as a determinant of CEO com-
pensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39:
575-606.
Hickson, D. I., Hinings. C. R., Lee, C. A., Schneck, R. E.,
& Pennings, J. E. 1971. A strategic contingencies
theory of interorganizational power. Administrative
Science QuarteHy, 16: 216-229.
Hitt, M., Bierman, L., Shimizu, K., & Kochhar, R. 2001.
Direct and moderating efGacts of human capital on
strategy and performance in profBssional service
firms: A resource-based perspective. Academy of
Management Journal, 44:13-28.
Hogan, T., & McPheters, L. 1980. Executive compensa-
tion: Performance versus personal chHracteristics.
SouAem Economic Journal, 46: 1060-1068.
Hubert, L. 1987. Assignment meUmds in combinatorial
data anafysis. New York: Marcel Dekker.
Jaccard, ]., Turrisi, R., & Wan, C. 1990. Jnteracfian
effects in maWple regression. London: Sage
Publications.
Jensen, M., & Murphy, K. 1990. Performance pay and top
management incentives. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 98: 225-264.
Keck, S. 1997. Top management team structure: DifEor-
ential e£Fects by environmental context. Organiza-
tion Science, 8(2): 143-156.
Keck, S., ft Tushman, M. 1993. Environmental and or-
ganizational context and executive team structure.
Academy cf Management Jaumal, 36:1314-1344.
Ken, S., & Kren, L. 1992. Effect of relative decision mon-
itoring on chief executive compensation. Academy
of Management Journal, 35: 370-397.
Krackhardt, D. 1987. QAP partialling as a test for spuri-
ousness. Social Networks, 9:171-186.
Krackhardt, D., & Stem, R. 1988. Informal networks and
organizational crises: An experimental simulation.
Social Psychology Quartoify, 51:123-140.
Lambert, R., Larcker, D., & Weigelt, K. 1993. The struc-
ture of organizational incentives. Administrative
Science Quarterfy, 38: 438-461.
Lancaster, H. 1995. Managing your career: That plum
assignment in a foreign capital may be a bad move.
Wall Street Journal, July 25: Bl.
Lancaster, H. 1998. Middle managers are back—^But now
they're "high-impact players." Wall Street Journal,
April 14: Bl.
Leonard, J. 1990. Executive pay and firm performance.
Industrial and Labor Relatimu Review, 43: 13S-
29S.
Lewellen, W., & Huntsman, B. 1970. Managerial pay and
corporate performance. American Econmnic Re-
view, 60: 710-720.
Main, B., O'Reilly, C, & Wade, J. 1993. Top executive
pay: Tournament or teamwork? Journal of Labor
Economics, 11: 606-628.
Main, B., O'Reilly, C, & Wade, J. 1995. The CEO, the
board of directors and executive compensation: Eco-
nomic and psychological perspectives. Industrial
and Corporate Change, 4: 293-332.
Melone, N. 1995. Reasoning in the executive suite: The
influence of role/experience-based expertise on de-
cision processes of corporate executives. Oi^oniza-
b'on Science, 5: 438-455.
Micbel, J., & Hambrick, D. 1992. Diversification posture
1102 \i:of/(.'iiii' (if MnnaiiKnwm UHIVIHII
and top management team characteristics. Academy
of Management Journal, 35: 9-37.
Miles, K., & Snow, C. 1978. OrganiEolitmal strategy,
structure, and process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Milkovich, C, Gerhart, fi., & Hannon, f. 1991. The effects
of research and development intensity on manage-
rial compensation in large organizations. Journal of
High Technology Management Resetuvh, 2(1):
133-150.
Miller, D. 1991. Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the
match between organization and environment. Man-
agement Science, 37: 34-52.
Mincer, I. 1970. The distribution of labor incomes: A
survey. Journal cfEconmnic Literature, 8: 1-26.
Mintzberg, H. 1978. Patterns on strategy formulation.
Management Science, 24: 934-948.
Murphy, K. J. 1999. Executive compensation. In O.
Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handhook of labor
economics, vol. 3b: 2485-2563. New York: North
Holland.
Ocasio, W., & Kim, H. 1999. The circulation of corporate
control: Selection of functional backgrounds of new
CEOs in large U.S. manufacturing Sims, 1981-1992.
Administrative Science Quarterfy, 44: 532-562.
O'Reilly, C, Main, B., & Crystal, G. 1988. CEO compen-
sation as tournament and social comparison: A tale
of two theories. i4diiiinisfrativB Science QuarteHy,
33: 257-274.
Pfeffer, J., & Davis-Blake, A. 1987. Understanding orga-
nizational wage structures: A resource dependence
approach. Academy of Management Journal, 30:
437-455.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. 1978. The extamd Gonfral of
oFganizations: A resource dependence perfec-
tive. New York: Harper & Row.
Porac,;. F.. Wade, J. B., & Pollock. T. G. 1999. Industry
categories and the politics of the comparable firm in
CEO compensation. Administrative Sdmice Quar-
terfy, 44: 112-144.
Porter, M. 1985. Compefitiva advantage: Creating and
sustaining saperimr paformance. New York: Free
Press.
Rajagopalan, N., & Prescott, J. E. 1990. Determinants of
top management compensation: Explaining the im-
pact of economic, behavioral, and strategic con-
structs and the moderating efEBCts of industry. Jour-
nal of Management, 16: 515-538.
Roth, K., & O'Donnell, S. 1996. Foreign subsidiary com-
pensation strategy: An agency theory perspective.
Academy of Management Joamal, 39: 678-703.
Sambharya, R. 1996. Foreign experience of top manage-
ment teams and international diversification strate-
gies of U.S. multinationals. Strategic Managanent
Journal, 17: 739-746.
Sanders, W. G. 2001. Behavioral responses of CEOs to
stock ownership and stock option pay. Acadwny of
Management Journal, 44: 477-492.
Sanders, VV. G., & Carpenter, M. A. 1998. International-
ization and firm governance: The roles of CEO
(lumpensation. top team composition, and board
structure. Academy of Management Journal, 41:
1-58-178.
Schneider, B. 1987. The people make the place. Pereon-
nel Psychology, 40: 437-453.
Song, |. 1982. Diversification strategies and the experi-
ence of top executives of large firms. Strategic Man-
agement Joumtil, 3: 377-380.
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Orgtmizatitms in action. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Tosi. H., Werner, S.. Katz, J., & Gomez-Mejia, L. 2000.
How much does performance matter? A meta-analy-
sis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26:
301-339.
Useem, M.. & Karabel, ]. 1986. Pathways to corporate
management. American Sodahg^cal Review, 51:
184-200.
Weick, K. 1979. The social psychology of organising.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Westphal, ]. D. 1998. Board games: How CEOs adapt to
structural board independence from management.
Administrative Science Quarterfy, 43: 511-537.
Westphal, I. D., & Zajac, E. 1995. Who shall govern?
CEO/board power, demographic similarity, and new
director selection. AAninistrative Science Quar^
terfy, 40: 60-84.
Wiersema, M., & Bantel, K. 1992. Top management team
demography and corporate strategic change. Acad-
emy of Management Journal, 35: 91-121.
Zald, M. 1969. The power and function of boards of
directors. American Journal of Sociology, 5: 97-
111.
APPENDIX
Human Capital Variable EfiEBcte under High a»iri Low
Levels of Stratagic Kesouice Allocationa
In Hypothesis 3, we propose that executives in posi-
tions associated with strategic resource allocations will
be paid more for their human capital. In order to test this
hypothesis, we needed to interpret the coefficients for
the interactions between the human capital variables and
the strategic allocations. Because the e%cts of our hu-
man capital variables are nonlinear, it was necessary to
control for the additional possible two-way interactions
created by a component of the squared term and the
allocation. These additional interactions complicate the
interpretation of the coefficients. Hypothesis 3 would be
supported if the interactions between an allocation vari-
able and the linear and squared terms of the human
capital variable were both positive and significant. Insig-
nificant or negative interactions would indicate no sup-
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port, and one positive and one negative interaction
would indicate a nonlinear relationship that might oi
might not support our hypothesis. In such instances, we
investigated the e£EBcts of the human capital variable at
high and low levels of the strategic allocation variable in
Older to assess whether Hypothesis 3 was supported.
To interpret our results, we JSrst had to examine our
regression equation, which is of the following fonn: ln
[pay] = PiX^ + jSaXj + 3^X3 + . . . p^n, where the betas
Os) are the coefBcients of our independent variables (the
Xs). By exponentiating both sides, one can lewiite the
above formula as follows: pay = exp(j3iXi) X
expOz^z) ^ expO3X3)... X expO^J. Because this is a
multiplicative model, we could then compare the sala-
ries of two individuals who were identical in every way
(with respect to our independent variables), except that
one worked in a firm with low levels of the strategic
resource allocation variable, while the other worked in a
firm in with high values of that variable. The relevant
coefficients to be examined were the interactions be-
tween the human capital variables and the strategic allo-
cation variables. The following formula was used to com-
pute tbe percentage difference in salaries between
identical individuals facing differing levels of the strate-
gic allocation variable for a given level of the human
capital variable: percent salary difference = 100 x
X expO^,^^,,/«J/expO^.^A^) X
- HI. where p,,^ and p^J'^ are the
coefficients for tbe interactions between tbe strategic allo-
cation variable and the linear and quadratic effects of the
human capital variables; X^CKA ^ ^ intBraction between
the human capital variable and high levels of tbe allocation
variable; X/,/,^ is the interaction between the human cap-
ital variable squared and high levels of the allocation vari-
able; X^ Ksc/ is tbe interaction between the human capital
variable and low levels of the strategic allocation variable;
and Xf^^i is the interactfon between the human capital
variable squared and low levels of the strategic allocation
variable.
To use this formula, we had to first assign values to the
strategic allocation variables. For example, using the co-
efficients from model 2 of Table 3(b), the percentage
premium paid to an marketing executive with 30 years of
work experience in a firm with advertising expenditures
of $340 million (in constant 1980 dollars) could be com-
pared to that received by an identical executive in a firm
with expenditures of $25 million as follows:
PA«, = .004,
hc'.c=-00006,
ln(340) X 30 = 174.87,
and
= hi(340) X 900 = 5,246.05, XAC», = ln(25) X 30
= 96.57,
Xhc^sci = ln(25) X 900 = 2,896.99.
Substituting these values in our fonnula yields the fol-
lowing: percent salary difference = 100 X ([(exp(.004 x
174.87) X exp(-0.00006 X 5,246.05)/exp(.004 X
96.57) X exp(-.00006 X 2,896.99)] - 1| = 18.8%.
The one negative coefficient raised the possibility that
Hypothesis 3 may not hold over the entire range of work
experience. We therefore recomputed the percentage sal-
aiy difference for various values of work experience. In
this instance, we found that executives in firms with high
advertising expenditures always received more pay than
those in firms with low advertising expenditures over the
entire range of work experience. As noted in the text, we
performed similar analyses for each functional area in
testing Hypothesis 3.
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